Resistance Won’t Make You Happy: Considering Solidarity Care as an Antidote to Burdened Virtues and a Means for Cultivating Epistemic Virtues
December 17th, 2025 | PHI 400: Intro to Epistemology | Prof. Heather Muraviov | Smith College
Recent studies on epistemic virtues have justifiably focused on how to cultivate the best epistemic character within knowers. While this is an important aspect of the field, it often overemphasizes individualist identity, which consequently traps knowers in praiseworthy resistance but simultaneously produces hopelessness. In this paper, I reject the assumed dichotomy between developing praiseworthy virtues that resist oppression and cultivating eudaimonia within oneself. Instead, I suggest that shared responsibility and solidarity care offer a more moderate account that allows marginalized knowers to approach both virtuous character and eudaimonia simultaneously.
In section I of this paper, I outline Jose Medina’s theory of kaleidoscopic consciousness, Lisa Tessman’s theory of burdened virtues, and Myisha Cherry’s argument for solidarity care. In section II, I argue that kaleidoscopic consciousness is burdened and, by nature, a hopeless pursuit. I suggest that both Tessman’s and Medina’s theories have pessimistic outcomes in part because of their individualistic and isolated approach. I conclude this section by claiming that Cherry’s account of solidarity care can, while not eliminating, lessen the burdensome aspects of kaleidoscopic consciousness and extend care into political, social, and epistemic arenas. I then critique the second-wave feminist assertion that the personal is inherently political in section III. To do so, I use the rise in affinity spaces as a case study to emphasize the limitations of identity-based support. I concur with Cherry’s claim that true solidarity cannot exist merely through shared identity, while acknowledging its possible detrimental legislative effects. I subsequently consider a possible objection to my argument, clarifying that my critique of the common theoretical approach to situated social identity is not an undermining of identity itself. Rather, it is a request to consider care in its various contexts more extensively. I conclude the paper in section IV by summarizing my argument and highlighting the discourse between traditional isolated emphasis on socially situated identity and intersectional, communal efforts towards justice. I suggest that this dynamic has rich possibilities for further study within the field.
I
In The Epistemology of Resistance, Jose Medina (2012) introduces the concept of meta-lucidity, which is the capacity to see through both oppressive and resistant lenses. Medina claims that marginalized knowers often experience meta-lucidity because they are constantly forced to switch between how they see themselves and how oppressive systems see them.[1] This is epistemically generative for them and puts marginalized knowers in an advantageous position for acquiring intellectual virtues.[2] In contrast, privileged knowers often lack regular epistemic friction and become meta-blind, or unaware of the extent of difference in knowers’ perspectives.[3] To address issues of intersectionality, Medina coins kaleidoscopic consciousness to describe the practice of acknowledging the infinite nature of perspectives and constantly extending their conscious capacities to cultivate intellectual virtues for all agents.[4] He also outlines epistemic responsibility, which operates under the shared acknowledgement and legitimizing of different perspectives.[5] Medina’s theory, despite his claim that it considers the political, social, and epistemic trifecta, relies heavily on epistemic responsibility and underplays how deeply epistemic resistance impacts marginalized knowers' capacity to live good lives. Here, it is valuable to consider how epistemic demands on marginalized knowers perpetuate oppression.
In Burdened Virtues, Lisa Tessman (2005) introduces a critical revision of Aristotelian eudaimonia, or the good life. Aristotle defines eudaimonia as having virtues, which belong to the self, and external goods (i.e. political power and wealth), which are conditions for the self. [6] Tessman extends Aristotle’s theory to emphasize the importance of inclusivity[7]. She suggests that living under oppression prevents marginalized knowers, specifically political activists, from developing true moral virtues. Instead, their virtues become burdened because they do not directly link to flourishing within the confines of oppression.[8] Tessman then goes on to claim that all instances of resistance have burdensome aspects for marginalized agents. She argues against agent responsibility, citing how little control subjects have over their external environment.[9] Thus, while they might have virtues, they lack external goods to achieve eudaimonia. While Tessman considers burdened virtues within a moral application, this concept can extend to Medina’s epistemic framework. Medina and Tessman’s theories connect in two major ways: (1) that there are likely burdened intellectual virtues akin to burdened moral virtues, and (2) that the debilitating effects of epistemic responsibility extend to marginalized knower’s capacities to achieve moral and political wellness. Thus, the concept of burdened virtues is a valuable way to consider the unequal demands placed on marginalized knowers who approach kaleidoscopic consciousness. These burdens appear unavoidable, but solidarity care could serve to lessen the oppressive aspects of kaleidoscopic consciousness and other burdened virtues.
Myisha Cherry explores the role of solidarity care in her piece, “How do we Take Care of Each Other in Times of Struggle” (2020). In it, she outlines three conditions that form the basis of strong solidarity. Those are: (1) a commitment to facing one’s prejudices, bias, and ego, (2) reciprocating care, and (3) expressing affirmation and encouragement.[10] Cherry argues that when these conditions are not met, agents can experience a care gap, where a few people must take on most of the weight of resistance.[11] Cherry’s conditions for solidarity, extend to, but are not limited by, the epistemic realm since care applies to social, political, and epistemic contexts. She also crucially notes that solidarity can exist across different situated identities so long as each member makes an ongoing commitment to the conditions.[12] These conditions are far more robust for lessening the individualist burden of resistance, both intra and inter communally, than Medina and Tessman’s theories. Solidarity care also points to some of the ways inherently associating the political with the personal can worsen hermeneutical gaps and reproduce oppressive systems of over-individualism.
I think kaleidoscopic consciousness cannot produce eudaimonia for marginalized knowers because it is burdensome. Knowers will always face the limitations of their own capacities as their consciousness expands within an oppressive environment, creating an uncomfortable and often hopeless state of internal conflict. Care gaps are another way to analyze Medina’s kaleidoscopic consciousness and his attempt at establishing reciprocity through epistemic responsibility. Both these failures offer a bleak future for liberatory efforts; however, Cherry’s work in solidarity care offers a possible antidote to emphasizing individual identity. Unlike Tessman, who suggests redefining flourishing, Cherry’s theory creates a route to genuinely lessening burdened demand for marginalized knowers.
II
Medina’s theory of kaleidoscopic consciousness has significant merit in that it attempts to undertake a pluralistic approach that considers how the political, social, and epistemic interact. However, kaleidoscopic consciousness remains unconvincing in a practical sense. Because marginalized knowers are already more likely to possess meta lucidity than their privileged counterparts, they are better situated to approach kaleidoscopic consciousness. In contrast, privileged knowers are far more likely to struggle to overcome the pervasiveness of meta-blindness. If instances of epistemic resistance are what cultivate intellectual virtues, as Medina suggests, this puts the marginalized knower in a conflicted position where actions that might cultivate intellectual virtues for the knower or hearer do not align with achieving eudaimonia. It is reasonable to suggest that traits such as open-mindedness are desirable for fighting oppression, but do not necessarily have a net positive effect on the marginalized knower. A knower might dedicate their life to engaging in epistemic and political resistance only to realize that they cannot fully escape the pervasiveness of oppressive frameworks. So, while cultivating these alleged intellectual virtues is praiseworthy, the knower never actually achieves the good life they fight for because they cannot single-handedly overcome their oppression. Thus, intellectual virtues cultivated through epistemic resistance have a burdened aspect. This also extends to moral virtues, which share similar burdens to their epistemic counterparts. I think Medina does not adequately consider how oppression infiltrates all aspects of knowers’ lives, including their ability to act freely and maintain autonomy. Instead, his theory produces a misalignment between ostensibly desirable virtues and the capacity for the subject to achieve eudaimonia.
Tessman argues that this depressing reality extends to all efforts towards resistance. The gap between praiseworthy virtues and their capacity to direct a knower towards the good life is omnipresent under oppressive environments where the knower lacks total agency. Tessman claims that this is not a reason to stop striving for moral virtues, but to reconsider conceptions of flourishing. This is a reasonable response to such a conclusion, but I am more interested in how the futility of achieving eudaimonia impacts marginalized knowers. Unsurprisingly, many disenfranchised knowers who approach kaleidoscopic consciousness and have excellent epistemic or moral virtues are extremely hopeless or nihilistic regarding liberatory efforts. Awareness towards the multiplicity of perspectives is much more common today since there is easy access to a wide array of perspectives online. However, it is unlikely that knowers can remain virtuous with these contradicting perspectives, many of which likely reinforce oppressive norms. Tessman generally does the opposite of Medina by suggesting that knowers’ moral virtues or vices are mostly a reflection of their environment, since this so heavily impacts their capacity for personal transformation. Ultimately, knowers likely have some level of agency in impacting their personal transformation, as Medina argues with epistemic responsibility, while simultaneously being limited by a dominating environment, as Tessman claims. Interestingly, both theories reproduce common stereotyping that either overly elevates marginalized subjects or disempowers them. These theories also emphasize the individual and their contrasting efforts towards achieving personal eudaimonia versus fighting for a marginalized other. They focus on ways individuals respond to this false dichotomy, rather than considering solidarity or other means of communal resistance and care.
Self-care today, which appears as one of the only solutions to the immensity of oppression, also reflects the tendency to individualize efforts towards eudaimonia. Cherry notes that even the concept of self-care today often relies on others to put in additional effort where the knower takes a step back.[13] While this highlights a major issue with the common conception of self-care, it also suggests that good self-care is communal by nature. Community care is self-care in that it invests in the same community a subject occupies. Cherry also explores how solidarity can impact care, resistance, and pursuing eudaimonia. Presumably, epistemic interactions with knowers who share solidarity are less burdensome and more advantageous for developing epistemic or moral virtues. Solidarity care operates more broadly than concepts like epistemic responsibility, which has a similar intention of ensuring knowers consider each other legitimately. Instead of merely focusing on epistemic resistance, solidarity care wraps the political, social, and epistemic trifecta into a single concept of care or empathy. The broadness of solidarity care makes it a better condition for epistemic resistance than epistemic responsibility. It effectively addresses the issue of how burdened virtues in instances of epistemic resistance impact marginalized knowers beyond the purely epistemic. It is also compatible with both the search for eudaimonia, which is inherently a communal search, and the desirable aspects of epistemic friction. This is not to say that epistemic friction would stop being burdensome, but if burdened knowers engage in interactions fueled by care and are surrounded by community in solidarity, these burdened aspects can be lessened. Ultimately, solidarity care offers a solution that does not place epistemic resistance and eudemonia for marginalized knowers quite so strongly at odds. Instead, it serves to lessen the gap between these efforts and suggests that an integrated approach through shared commitment to lessening others' oppression might be a better way to improve the long-term feasibility of fighting for liberation.
III
It is, however, important to note that solidarity cannot form merely through shared identity. Consider affinity spaces, which have become increasingly popular in recent years. These spaces theoretically offer a respite from burdened virtues, since they do not reproduce greater systems of oppression. They are also supposed to lessen the harmful effects of social or political isolation. However, knowers typically have fairly heterogeneous perspectives beyond their shared identity in affinity spaces that produce complex intersectional dynamics. Epistemic resistance is still present, but it is likely to feel more burdensome on participants since the emphasis is not on shared care but on a shared identity. Additionally, affinity groups do not reflect regular oppressive conditions, and while there is heterogeneity present, there is a noticeable limit to diversity. Since they pull knowers from an oppressive world into a space that often aims to avoid engaging with epistemic resistance in a virtuous way, affinity groups cannot considerably contribute to liberation. Thus, the affinity group, which centers identity over a mission or shared cause, is not representative of true solidarity. In contrast, true solidarity forms through individuals’ collective commitment to a shared mission and values, rather than specific identity. Solidarity accepts the inevitability of epistemic resistance and generally encourages more identity diversity to develop epistemic virtues. However, solidarity care simultaneously aims to minimize the burdensome aspects of this intrinsic resistance. Because solidarity can address issues of resistance and achieving eudaimonia, knowers remain active in their pursuit of meta lucidity without necessarily succumbing to their burdened virtues. Thus, they can better approach achieving eudemonia compared to those in affinity groups whose internal environment does not adequately reflect the external world.
Some might express reasonable concerns here over the tangible effects emphasizing communal care might have on conceptualizing or legitimizing identity. Deemphasizing identity in the past has indeed led to continued erasure, invalidation, and marginalization. Most changes in policy and legislation, such as diversity quotas, rely on clear delineations between identities to push towards more equality. These efforts are vital in establishing formal efforts towards justice. However, when I suggest considering solidarity care more legitimately, I am not condoning identity erasure or invalidation. Rather, I mean to speak to the ways that modern individualist conceptions of identity limit our capacities for solidarity and compassion. The extensive work on hermeneutical gaps and socially situated identity within the epistemic field reflects a consensus today that a subject’s unique perspective can never be fully understood by others. This concept is true to an extent; however, modern efforts towards liberation often fail to move from conceptualizing identity individually to more communally. Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) efforts, such as establishing quotas for students or creating affinity groups, can easily reproduce burdened virtues for participants because identity is seen merely as a checkbox, rather than a complex and contextually implicated feature of a knower. However, solidarity care, which is necessary to mitigate such burdens, cannot be enforced through formal policy since it is an internal orientation of the knower. Herein lies a major modern issue of identity that demands further exploration within philosophic and political fields. Ultimately, I support DEI initiatives that offer legal steps towards equality, while highlighting that true liberation relies on the knower’s capacities to extend solidarity care and kaleidoscopic consciousness simultaneously. This claim maintains that knowledge is important for liberatory purposes, but not sufficient on its own. Without solidarity care and the ability to extend consciousness, the fight for liberation will remain caught in the false dichotomy of liberation versus wellbeing.
IV
Jose Medina’s theory of kaleidoscopic consciousness, which suggests that a meta lucid approach is necessary to develop intellectual virtues in instances of epistemic resistance, is unfeasible because it demands too much responsibility from a marginalized knower. This produces, as Lisa Tessman explains, burdened virtues. These are traits that, while being praiseworthy and desirable in some capacity, do not contribute to a marginalized knower’s achievement of eudaimonia. Both Tessman’s and Medina’s theories are valuable for considering the efforts towards justice and well-being simultaneously, but their focus on single agents produces an unavoidable futility in achieving eudaimonia and kaleidoscopic consciousness simultaneously. Here, Myisha Cherry’s account of solidarity care offers a possible alternative. Solidarity care exists for members who commit themselves to shared values or a mission. Thus, their compassionate values would underlie political, social, and epistemic contexts, including those of epistemic resistance. This approach could help to lessen the burdensome aspects of resistance since it is shouldered by more people, while simultaneously creating an ecosystem that encourages epistemic resistance that is generative for intellectual virtues. However, I express in my case study and counterargument that solidarity cannot exist merely through shared identity. Affiliation through shared identity tend to reproduce certain blindnesses that arise from situated identity and often fail to use instances of epistemic resistance generatively, since it is often seen as undesirable and akin to the oppressive external world. However, if a group of diverse knowers can deeply embody a shared mission, it becomes a lens that allows for resistant efforts while mitigating the burdensome aspects of such exchanges. I acknowledge that it is very challenging to enact shared care into formal policy, so future studies could explore the dynamic between the need for tangible legislation that relies on overt identity markers and exploring ways to cultivate solidarity care regarding cross-identity interfacing.
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Citations
[1] Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations (Oxford University Press 2013), 192–93, 196.
[2] Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance 44.
[3] Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 72–74.
[4] Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 200–203.
[5] Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance,195.
[6] Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford University Press, 2005), 21.
[7] Tessman, Burdened Virtues 90–91.
[8] Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 108.
[9] Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 24–26.
[10] Cherry, “Solidarity Care: How to Take Care of Each Other in Times of Struggle,” Public Philosophy Journal, 3 no. 1 (2020): 6–10, https://www.doi.org/10.25335/PPJ.3.1-4.
[11] Cherry, “Solidarity Care,” 7.
[12] Cherry, “Solidarity Care,” 5.
[13] Cherry, “Solidarity Care,” 10.
Annotated Bibliography
Cherry, Myisha. “Solidarity Care: How to Take Care of Each Other in Times of Struggle.” Public Philosophy Journal 3, no. 1 (2020): 1–14.
Cherry provides a possible solution to the negative mental and existential implications of awareness on knowers through solidarity care. She outlines three major conditions of solidarity care, describing how such conditions extend to shared responsibility, which lessens mental and existential burden. Her work extends beyond typical epistemic focus on individuals, expanding discourse surrounding liberatory virtues and care ethics. However, it lacks certain theoretical robustness which weakens its argument at points.
Medina, José. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Medina expands upon feminist standpoint epistemology and socially situated identity, arguing that the unique experiences of marginalized knowers place them in epistemically opportune positions. He suggests that the regular epistemic friction marginalized knower experience when their personal perspectives clash with dominate ones creates the unique capacity for them to consider multiple perspectives simultaneously. Medina’s consideration of epistemic friction offers a valuable mode for liberation. However, his account of cultivating epistemic character within marginalized knowers is too demanding and optimistic for practical application.
Tessman, Lisa. Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. Oxford University Press, 2005.
Tessman uses a critical revision of Aristotelian eudaimonia to object to the common feminist claim that personal transformation and consciousness raising can liberate the subject. Instead, she argues that marginalized agents experience systemic bad luck under oppressive, which inhibits their external goods, and thus their ability to achieve eudaimonia. She suggests redefining flourishing to actually cohere with virtues, while acknowledging that some virtues cultivated under oppression inherently have burdensome aspects. Her theory grounds idealistic accounts of epistemic character building within the pervasiveness of oppression, but it discounts agent responsibility and autonomy.
