Political Analysis — Considering the Social Conditions Outlined in Weber’s ‘Vocation Lectures’ Through Hobbes & Rousseau

Smith College: GOV 100: Introduction to Political Thinking — Professor Kye Barker — Nov. 13th, 2024

Prompt: In his “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber pursues an analysis of the external conditions of modern political activity through political parties and the modern state as well as the inner conditions of ethical orientations. Is politics as Weber understands it desirable in either of the theoretical states as respectively described by Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau? Why or why not?

 ———

In Max Weber’s essay, “Politics as a Vocation” (Weber 2004), he argues that if the modern citizen is to gain political freedom, he must acquiesce to a political party and support its leader, even if he does not fully agree with the leader's will. While joining a political party necessitates a concession of the personal will to increase the chance of electing an official the citizen supports, it is a better choice than not joining a political party, which renders the citizen’s voice obsolete. Weber is widely skeptical of the influence of political parties as the personal interests of leaders can easily dominate over followers. Thus, the political party tends to corrupt as it only emphasizes certain voices, and leads to inequality within the political system as a whole. For him, this aspect of modern politics does not reflect true freedom but competition for seats in parliament that compromises citizens’ abilities to share their wills. Weber argues that to gain true political freedom in Germany, the citizen must settle on his personal will and submit to a political party oriented towards the leader’s interests. This trade-off is undesirable to both Hobbes and Rousseau, as they would view the existence of a party leader as an infringement upon the freedoms of the citizen under the state, specifically through the party leader’s role as a representative and as a figure who conflicts with the citizen’s will and removes powers from the sovereign.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argues that freedom for the citizen under an ideal state lies in unrestricted movement in a materialist sense while simultaneously tying man to a single sovereign who establishes laws that ensure man does not return to his devious natural tendencies. Hobbes maintains that man is inherently equal, which consequently causes competition and unrest as anyone can commit violence. Thus, a sovereign must exist to prevent man from falling into his natural state. Because of his pessimistic view towards human nature, Hobbes argues for a heavily involved sovereign where men “conferre all their power and strength upon one Man” and reduce the “plurality of voices, unto one Will…” [Emphasis of original] (Hobbes 1996, 120). The encroaching nature of the sovereign that Hobbes outlines and the expectation that the citizen remains completely submissive offers a reductive and materialistic understanding of freedom. Hobbes does not view freedom as the ability to do but rather as the lack of obstacles that inhibit man from action. Hobbes argues, “A Free-Man, is he… which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to” [Emphasis in original] (Hobbes 1996, 146). This conclusion functions with his establishment of a supreme sovereign, where any domain the sovereign removes itself from holds no obstructions and ensures freedom for the citizen. It also points to Hobbes’ understanding of freedom, where he views freedom as a physical condition, not an orientation of the mind or body. Hobbes' idea of freedom is, therefore, quite restrictive and only exists in the spaces where the sovereign is not, as he views man’s natural orientation as profoundly negative and understands freedom in a physical manner.

Therefore, Hobbes is in fundamental disagreement with the existence of parties as they are an additional association that splits the citizen between the will of the party and the sovereign. Because Hobbes’ conception of freedom exists under the omittance of sovereign laws, a subject binding his will to the political party would further reduce his freedom as he needs to consider both the laws of the sovereign and the party. This dynamic divides the subject’s will whenever the party disagrees with the sovereign, which Hobbes maintains should rule supremely. The conditions Weber outlines are a particularly severe example of this disunity as the political party is the singularly most important political power, despite the existence of parliament. So, while the political party is not comparable in legislative power to parliament, it is in terms of gathering support from the people. Additionally, the existence of multiple political parties further splits Hobbes' idea of the singular will as multiple, equally influential powers, compete to win favor over the citizen. In Hobbes' opinion, this disunity inevitably leads to collapse as “Powers divided mutually destroy each other” (Hobbes 1996, 225). Thus, the political party serves as an influential force that can gain favor from the citizen and divert his will away from the sovereign. This is catastrophic under Hobbes’ described political system where both freedom and security rely on the ability to maintain a singular sovereign and subject’s undivided obedience.

In contrast, Rousseau’s ideas of freedom exist more fundamentally as the absence of rule over another, where, paradoxically, each man gives himself completely to all other citizens and thus maintains the equilibrium of his freedom. This counterintuitive structure ensures man never has to obey another while simultaneously maintaining a sovereign capable of acting on behalf of citizens as a whole. Rousseau argues that freedom is an inherent internal condition and “To renounce freedom is to renounce one’s humanity, one’s rights as a man and equally one’s duties” (Rousseau 1968, 55). In his opinion, nothing can justify one man ruling over another due to this internal quality of freedom. Therefore, a sovereign must be made of the masses, not a single ruler. His solution to this dilemma of maintaining individual freedoms while ensuring a secure state is to form the masses into a single sovereign that functions from “the total alienation by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole community” (Rousseau 1968, 60). This universal submission ensures that man keeps his rights as every citizen is equally handicapped by the sovereign. The sovereign Rousseau describes also places members into dual identities as citizens, obliged to enact laws, and as subjects, who must obey. This dynamic keeps man’s self-interest in check and maintains a secure state as “Duty and self-interest thus equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other mutual aid” (Rousseau 1968, 63). Thus, for Rousseau, freedom exists for people under a legitimate state so long as all totally give themselves over to the sovereign as citizens and subjects. By producing a universal and artificial subjugation, man maintains the freedoms he previously enjoyed and experiences the benefits of living under a single sovereign.

Yet the establishment of political parties, which do not allow for every man to speak equally and essentially function as systems of representatives, do not reflect the internal and inherent quality of freedom Rousseau argues is central to man’s identity as human. Instead, they point to a hierarchical system that necessitates obedience and thus compromises the liberty of its citizens. In Weber’s description, the party leader essentially functions as a representative who takes the will of his many followers and then attempts to execute in favor of them while in parliament. However, Rousseau is firmly against such representative systems as he prioritizes the individual will, expressing “it is imperative that there should be no sectional associations in the state, and that every citizen should make up his own mind for himself” (Rousseau 1968, 73). He argues a representative can too easily corrupt his followers’ independent wills into something they are not in support of his private interests. Instead, if the citizen wishes to truly be free, he should only hold himself to the universal covenant of submission to each other, and “So long as the subjects submit to such covenants alone, they obey nobody but their own will” (Rousseau 1968, 77). In contrast, representative system is not one where each citizen has an equal opportunity to voice or execute his will. Political leaders have significantly more power as citizens must join their parties and compromise on their ideals if they wish to hold any substantial political power. This settlement undermines Rousseau’s governmental system which necessitates universal and equal submission of all citizens to maintain an equilibrium of freedom for all. Therefore, Rousseau would despise a governmental system based on political parties as it does not allow each man to voice his own will and corrupts the central tenets of internal freedom he emphasizes as central to man's identity.

Ultimately, neither Hobbes nor Rosseau finds Weber’s conditions desirable, but for significantly different reasons. Hobbes views freedom as a physical experience that is present so long as nothing is preventing it. He takes a literal approach to freedom, where external conditions are his primary interest. In contrast, Rousseau views freedom as an internal orientation, one paramount to man’s identity. His approach to freedom is internal and intrinsically linked to man’s orientation. These diverging ideas of freedom are also reflected in their conceptions of a legitimate sovereign and, ultimately, in why they both find Weber’s political system undesirable. Hobbes views the relationship between a sovereign and its subjects as the only relevant concern when constructing a thriving state. He disagrees with political parties as they further complicate this relationship and weaken sovereign powers. Rousseau, however, views the maintenance of individual identity and will as paramount and, therefore, argues for a sovereign that does not function from any singular man’s obedience to another. Yet he would also critique Weber as the political party undermines individual wills through political leaders who act as representatives that attempt to speak on behalf of multiple people. Ultimately, while Hobbes and Rousseau have different ideas regarding the role of freedom for man and within the state, both would critique Weber’s description of political parties as a condition that lessens the citizen's freedom and therefore is undesirable.

 

 

 ———

References

Hobbes, Thomas. 1996. Leviathan. Translated by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 1968. The Social Contract. Translated by Maurice Cranston. Penguin Classics.

Weber, Max. 2004. “Politics as a Vocation.” In The Vocation Lectures, edited by David Owen and Tracy Strong, translated by Rodney Livingstone. Hackett Publishing Company.

Previous
Previous

Literary Analysis— Wrestling with Race, Rage, & Retribution in John Murillo’s “Refusal to Mourn the Deaths of Three Men, by Gunfire, in Brooklyn”

Next
Next

Comparative Analysis— Born With Clipped Wings: Limitations to Social Mobility in Education for Marginalized Communities in India and the United States